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THE NEW CLASS ACTIONS IN JAPAN 
Michael J. Madderra †  
Abstract:    This comment provides the first journal publication on Japan’s new 
class action law, promulgated on December 11, 2013.  In the past, Japanese attorneys 
used rules of joinder and other alternatives to form de facto class action lawsuits.  This 
comment provides insight into the development of Japan’s new class action law through a 
discussion of the historical context in which it was created.  After discussing the law and 
its development, this comment argues that Japan should examine U.S. jurisprudence to 
prepare for challenges to the new class action system.  Comparing Japanese and U.S. 
class action systems is appropriate because of similarities in their class formulations.  
This comment analyzes recent U.S. court decisions that show controversy and 
disagreement about how to interpret the class certification provisions.  By looking at 
difficulties currently facing U.S. courts, Japan can better prepare itself to implement its 
law.  Conversely, this comment presents the alternative proposition that due to the 
Japanese law’s bifurcated structure, U.S. litigants and courts can look to Japan’s new law 
for creative means of litigating class actions. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CLASS ACTIONS IN JAPAN 
This comment provides the first thorough examination of class action 
law in Japan.  Until recently, there was no formalized system of class action 
lawsuits in Japan.1  Class action lawsuits were informally processed through 
the use of joinder and consolidation under the Japanese civil code, but these 
processes were not widely used for large numbers of plaintiffs.2  Although 
injured parties could join cases with similar facts, such parties were 
plaintiffs who actually appeared in the case—they did not represent those 
“who did not join in the lawsuit.”3  Japan did not have the simplified opt-in 
or opt-out systems available in Europe and the United States.4  While 
                                                      
†  Michael J. Madderra is a 2014 J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law.  He 
received his B.A. with honors from Stanford University in 2011.  The author would like to thank Elizabeth 
Porter, Carl F. Goodman, Brittany A. Harris, Nobu Yamanouchi, Shigenori Matsui, and the editorial staff 
of the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal for providing invaluable assistance.  Their support was 
instrumental in completing this comment.   
1  Carl F. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure Code: Has it Fostered a Rule of Law Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 511, 589 (2004); Kengo Nishigaki & Takeshi Yoshida, The 
New Class Action Legislation Promulgated in Japan, BAKER & MCKENZIE 1 (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://bakermckenzie.co.jp/e/material/dl/supportingyourbusiness/newsletter/disputeresolution/ClientAlert_2
01401_DisputeResolution_E.pdf (last visited May 17, 2014). 
2  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1. 
3  Goodman 2004, supra note 1, at 590. 
4  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Katharina Diel, International Practice: Overview/Comparison of 
U.S. & E.U. Judicial Class Action Structures, CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (CPR) INST. FOR DISP. 
RESOL., http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/593/International-Practice-
OverviewComparison-of-US-EU-Judicial-Class-Action-Structures-Web.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
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research is available on Japan’s previous group litigation methods, such 
material is sparse due to the system’s limited use. 
Since 2000, Japan modernized its class action system, 5  as 
demonstrated by the allowance of injunctive relief for groups of consumers 
in 20076 and the creation of a new class action law in December 2013.7  This 
modernization has not come without resistance.  Japanese culture tends to 
prioritize alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation, rather 
than litigation.8  Despite this reluctance towards class action and litigation 
generally, Japan will benefit greatly from its new class action system.  A 
formal class action system promotes judicial economy and provides 
predictability, consistency, and a means for unprotected consumers to obtain 
judicial remedy.  In December 2013, Japan codified a consumer class action 
system that is set to take effect within the next three years.9  This law 
directly impacts consumers’ ability to recover from harmful business 
practices and product defects.10  Additionally, this law will significantly 
impact corporations doing business with consumers in Japan.11 
This author argues that Japan should look to U.S. case law to prepare 
for unexpected difficulties it may encounter in implementing its new class 
action law.  Providing a defined set of class action rules will encourage 
lawsuits against those that take actions adverse to consumers’ interests;12 the 
                                                      
5  See generally JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYS. REFORM 
COUNCIL – FOR A JUST. SYS. TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (June 12, 2001), available 
at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html [hereinafter REFORM COUNCIL]. 
6  A New Class Action System in Japan (New Act Enacted and Promulgated in December 2013), 
ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE 1 (Jan. 2014), https://www.amt-law.com/en/pdf/bulletins4_pdf/ 
140114.pdf (last visited May 17, 2014); see generally Shōhishakeiyakuhō [The Consumer Contract Act], 
Law No. 61 of 2000, http://www.consumer.go.jp/kankeihourei/keiyaku/file/keiyakuhou_1.pdf (Japan), 
translated in http://www.consumer.go.jp/english/cca/index.html#3-2 [hereinafter Consumer Contract Act 
translation]. 
7  See generally Shōhisha no zaisan-teki higai no shūdan-tekina kaifuku no tame no minji no saiban 
tetsudzuki no tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Provisions of Civil Court Procedures for Collective 
Recovery of Property Damage of Consumers], Act No. 96 of 2013, http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/ 
pdf/130419-2_131213.pdf (Japan) [hereinafter 2013 Class Action Law]; see also ANDERSON MŌRI & 
 TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6. 
8  See Ikuo Sugawara, The Current Situation of Class Action in Japan, GLOBAL CLASS ACTION 
EXCHANGE 3 (2007), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Japan_ 
National_Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that 
“many consumers are reluctant to file [lawsuits]”); Goodman 2004, supra note 1, at 513. 
9  Shōhisha no zaisan-teki higai no shūdan-tekina kaifuku no tame no minji no saiban tetsudzuki no 
tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Provisions of Civil Court Procedures for Collective Recovery of 
Property Damage of Consumers], Act No. 96 of 2013, available at http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/pdf/ 
130419-2_131213.pdf (Japan); see ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6. 
10 See ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 1, 4. 
11  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1. 
12 See ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 5 (stating that the new law “will increase 
the risk of litigation for business operators from consumers”). 
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class action system should thus encourage responsible social behavior.  In 
the United States, the class certification system effectuates the legal goals of 
efficiency, consistency, and consumer protection, but it is subject to 
controversy and divergent judicial interpretation.13  The U.S. system, while 
not perfect, highlights the benefits of a developed class action system, as 
explained in Part IV, infra. 
This comment begins in Part II by introducing the history of class 
action litigation in Japan.  Part III describes the current state of class action 
lawsuits in Japan, as well as the recently passed law.  Part IV explains the 
class action system used in the United States.   Examining the U.S. class 
action system is appropriate because Japan’s legal system post-World War II 
was influenced by American procedural philosophy and the common law 
system.14  This similarity makes direct comparisons possible, and means that 
the experiments with class actions in one country could inform innovation in 
the other.  Part IV also examines recent difficulties that American courts 
have faced in interpreting their own class action laws.  By examining the 
issues U.S. judges have faced in interpreting class action law, Japan can 
prepare itself for similar challenges.  In Part V, this comment explains how 
Japan’s new class action law provides a unique opportunity to benefit 
consumers.  Lastly, this comment suggests that Japan’s new law, with its 
bifurcated structure, may provide a blueprint to resolve some of the issues 
present in U.S. class action litigation. 
II. THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 
This Part discusses the Japanese legal system’s structure.  First, this 
Part looks at Japan’s Constitution and court system.  Though Japanese 
culture has historically been considered reluctant towards litigation,15 that 
perception is slowly changing.16  Pressure to reform the legal system built up 
in the 1990s17 and resulted in the creation of a new Civil Procedure Code,18 
the development of new law schools,19 and eventually the creation of Japan’s 
new class action law.20  Before discussing the new class action law, this Part 
                                                      
13  See infra Part IV. 
14  TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 1.03[3] &  
§ 1.04[6][a] (Taniguchi et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
15  See infra note 44. 
16  See infra note 52. 
17  See infra note 50.  
18  See infra note 72. 
19  See infra note 63. 
20  See supra note 7. 
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addresses the aggregate litigation substitutes that preceded class action in 
Japan. 
A.  Basic Principles of the Japanese Legal System 
The Japanese legal system incorporates elements of both European 
and American legal systems.21  Its adoption of American legal practices can 
be traced back to the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II.22  Carl F. 
Goodman, law professor at Georgetown University and Tokyo University, 
explained that between the American post-War occupation and present times, 
“the Japanese tended to avoid using the legal system to resolve disputes, and 
instead used more traditional models of alternative dispute resolution . . . 
characterized by conciliation, compromise and mediation.”23  This avoidance 
helps explain the lack of a developed class action system in Japan.   
In the aftermath of World War II, Japan adopted a new Constitution.24  
The Constitution provided structure to the government and guidance to a 
new Japanese legal system. 25   The Constitution contains three basic 
principles:  sovereignty rests with the people, Japan desires peaceful 
cooperation with other countries, and laws must respect fundamental human 
rights.26  These principles place Japan’s power with its people.27   The 
judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court,28  and is comprised of 
                                                      
21  Goodman 2004, supra note 1, at 513.  
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  On October 4, 1945, at a meeting with General MacArthur, a Japanese cabinet member asked 
whether General MacArthur had instructions “about the make-up of the government.”  Creation of the 
Japanese Constitution (1945-1946), PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/peopleevents/pande 
AMEX102.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).  Due to a mistranslation, the word “make-up” was replaced 
with “constitution,” and the Japanese cabinet member left the meeting believing that MacArthur ordered 
the creation of a new constitution.  Id. 
25  See id. 
26 See generally NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan), translated in 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html) (stating the 
following:  “sovereign power resides with the people[,]”; “we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity 
the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations[,]”; and “[t]he people shall not be prevented from 
enjoying any of the fundamental human rights.”). 
27  Though the legal foundations of the Japanese Constitution are beyond the scope of this comment, 
the reader might be interested to further study Japan and the rule of law.  Some argue that the Japanese 
Constitution is based on the concept of the rule of law.  See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 26 (3d ed. 2009).  
Others argue, however, that Japan has failed to attain the rule of law in its legal system.  See Setsuo 
Miyazawa & Hiroshi Otsuka, Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan. 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. 
& POL’Y J. 2, 18 (2000); Setsuo Miyazawa, Reform in Japanese Legal Education: The Politics of Judicial 
Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 89, 107 (2001). 
28  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76 (Japan). 
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fourteen Justices and a Chief Justice.29  Beneath the Supreme Court are the 
inferior courts.30  The inferior courts include eight High Courts, fifty District 
Courts, fifty Family Courts, and 438 Summary Courts.31 
Japan’s court system can be thought of as having four tiers.  At the top 
tier is the Supreme Court, which has final appellate review power.32  Below 
the Supreme Court sit the High Courts, which conduct appellate reviews.33  
On the third tier are the District and Family Courts.34  The District Courts 
are courts of general and original jurisdiction, while the Family Courts 
handle family matters and juvenile cases.35  The Summary Courts are part of 
a quasi-fourth tier.36  The Summary Courts oversee some civil matters 
(depending on the monetary amount at stake) and minor criminal cases.37 
Critics attack the Japanese legal system for its slow process, lack of 
litigation tools for plaintiffs, and low participation levels by citizens.38  
While many view the United States as a country that favors litigation, 
Japanese people typically avoid litigation.39  As one author commented, “[a] 
                                                      
29  Overview of the Judicial System in Japan, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
english/judicial_sys/overview_of/overview/index.html#02 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) [hereinafter 
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN]. 
30  Id. 
31 Id.; Junko Gono et al., Overview of Legal Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region: Japan, 
SCHOLARSHIP@CORNELL LAW, Apr. 10, 2004, at 8-9; Elliott J. Hahn, Perspective: An Overview of the 
Japanese Legal System, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 517, 533 (1983). 
32  SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 29. 
33  Gono, supra note 31, at 8. 
34  SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 29. 
35  Gono, supra note 31, at 8. 
36  See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 29 (chart showing Summary Courts on the fourth row 
of the court system). 
37  Gono, supra note 31, at 9. 
38  Toshiko Takenaka, Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Court Systems for Patent Litigation: A 
Special Court or Special Division in a General Court?, 5 SYMPOSIUM OF CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDY 
& RES. ON INTELL. PROP. 47, 1 (July 2000), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/ 
symposium/number5/pub5atcl6.pdf (stating that “U.S. patent owners and domestic industries have long 
complained about the slow and inadequate relief provided by Japanese courts in patent infringement 
cases”); Goodman 2004, supra note 1, at 526 (noting that “the Japanese judicial system has drawn its 
boundaries in a manner less favorable to plaintiffs”); R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The 
Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 269, 294-95 (2002) (showing that in 2002 
Japan had roughly one lawyer for every 7,000 residents.  By comparison, in 2000 the United States had one 
lawyer for every 300 residents); Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan’s 
Changing View Towards Civil Litigation, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 769, 797 (2001) [hereinafter 
Goodman 2001] (“[There are] huge court backlogs and a litigation system wherein cases may take years to 
try.”). 
39  Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., 
CASES, CODES, AND COMMENT. 176, 176 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012); see also Steve Lohr, 
Tokyo Air Crash: Why Japanese Do Not Sue, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., CASES, CODES, AND COMMENT. 
166 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Are Americans 
More Litigious? Some Quantitative Evidence, in THE AM. ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 4 (Yale 
U. Press ed., 2013). 
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Japanese plaintiff must have knowledge of facts and witnesses to support his 
or her case before filing a complaint.”40  Potential litigants must take 
numerous factors into account before filing a lawsuit in Japan.  Compared to 
the United States, monetary damage awards are relatively low. 41  
Additionally, Japanese courts do not award punitive damages.42  These 
factors contribute to a legal system that makes winning less lucrative for 
plaintiffs.  Even when victory is likely, filing a lawsuit is a lengthy process 
and may not be worth the expense and time.  In Japan, “it is not 
unusual . . . for complex lawsuits to take more than 10 years to go through 
the courts.”43  In sum, the Japanese legal system has discouraged lawsuits.44  
Proponents of reforming the Japanese legal system argue that the system 
needs to better address the Japanese peoples’ needs45 and increase citizens’ 
participation.46 
Japan has taken steps to liberalize its legal system in order to expedite 
lawsuits and ensure judicial fairness,47 but this comment argues that its lack 
of a developed class action system has harmed consumers.  In Japan, “it is 
difficult to protect the interests of a large number of plaintiffs as with class 
actions.  In this respect, the Japanese system may be insufficient in 
providing redress to victims.  In particular, parties seeking small amounts 
may simply give up any opportunity of receiving compensation.” 48  
Plaintiffs have faced an uphill battle in Japan.  For example, between 1947 
and 1985, no private antitrust lawsuit succeeded in Japanese courts.49  Mass 
tort, antitrust, and employment class action claimants remained without the 
necessary tools to satisfactorily litigate their disputes. 
                                                      
40  Goodman 2001, supra note 38, at 789. 
41  Id. at 794. 
42  Id. 
43  Suan Chira, If You Insist on Your Day in Court, You May Wait and Wait and Wait, in THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., supra note 39, at 168. 
44  “In Japan . . . the harmony of community is valued most and people go to court only as a last 
resort.”  Steve Lohr, supra note 39, at 166, 167; Leslie Helm, A Look at Japan’s Efforts to Discourage 
Lawsuits, Jan. 14, 1991, http://lesliehelm.com/a-look-at-japans-efforts-to-discourage-lawsuits/ (last visited 
May 7, 2014); see generally Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical 
Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31 (2006). 
45  One such “need” includes “clarifying legal rules . . . as to ease the resolution of ‘various 
disputes[.]’”  George Schumann, Beyond Litigation: Legal Education Reform in Japan and What Japan’s 
New Lawyers Will Do, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 475, 516 (2006). 
46  Id. at 515. 
47  Goodman 2001, supra note 38, at 809-10. 
48  Koji Shindo, Settlement of Disputes of Securities Transactions, 14 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 399 (1991).  Koji Shindo argues that class action suits are needed to improve Japan’s legal system.  Id. 
at 403 (stating that “it is urgent that the merits of the introduction of class action suits and a discovery 
system into Japanese law through legislative amendment be considered”). 
49  J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional 
Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 617 (1985). 
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Pressure to reform the legal system began to boil over following the 
burst of Japan’s economic bubble in the early 1990s.50  The crisis may have 
served as a catalyst, revealing to the government that change was needed.51  
The increase in litigation in Japan between 1986 and 200252 may have also 
signaled to the government that reform was necessary. 
In 1999, Japan took the first steps towards reforming its legal 
system.53  Former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed creating a reform-
orientated advisory council, which was officially established by the Japanese 
Congress, the National Diet.54  This Justice System Reform Council, an 
independent commission,55 issued numerous recommendations to reform the 
legal system.56   One of the recommendations included studying group 
litigation and comparing it to the Japanese sentei tojisha rule.57  The sentei 
tojisha rule, discussed in Part II.B., is a Japanese alternative to class action.  
The Council took note of the German and American class action systems58 
and determined that the sentei tojisha rule should perform a function similar 
to a class action system.59  
These recommendations were not purely political, as several of them 
resulted in substantive changes to Japan’s legal landscape.  In 2001, Japan 
implemented major judicial reform to modernize the judicial system.60  
These initial reforms, including speeding up the judicial process and 
increasing the availability of attorneys, were designed to make the judicial 
system more accessible to members of the public.61  In addition to making 
changes to the courts, the government implemented a new law school system 
to overhaul legal training.62 
                                                      
50  Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 44, at 36; HIROSHI ODA, supra note 27, at 57. 
51  Mariko Fujii & Masahiro Kawai, Lessons from Japan’s Banking Crisis, 1991-2005, 9 (Asian 
Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 222, 2010), available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.06.29.wp222. 
lessons.japan.banking.crisis.1991.2005.pdf (“[A]uthorities lacked the legal framework to resolve troubled, 
large financial institutions.”). 
52  See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 44, at 36-37. 
53  See Daniel H. Foote, Forces Driving and Shaping Legal Training Reform in Japan, in THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., supra note 39, at 72. 
54  Id. 
55  James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese Law Schools: Putting the 
Professional into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 303, 310 (2004). 
56  Id.; see generally REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 5.   
57  REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 5, at ch. II pt. 1 § 7.  
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  HIROSHI ODA, supra note 27, at 55-56. 
61  Id. 
62  See generally Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 55. 
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Japan implemented a new law school system in 2004 and created sixty 
new law schools.63  According to the Justice System Reform Council, new 
law schools aimed to be “professional schools providing education 
especially for training for the legal profession.”64  This means that the new 
schools focus on training students to think in legal terms, and “provide 
compulsory instruction in core legal subjects of private and public law.”65  
While the new schools have been relatively successful in meeting the 
Reform Council’s goals of “expand[ing] the quality and quantity” of 
attorneys,66 they have not met all their stated goals.  For example, every 
person who aspires to be a lawyer in Japan must gain admittance to the 
Legal Training and Research Institute.67  To gain admittance, applicants must 
pass an exam that is administered annually.68  The exam is extremely 
difficult; on average, an applicant must take the exam five times before he 
passes.69  With the new law schools and a newly implemented bar exam, the 
Reform Council anticipated that the exam passage rate would increase to 
between seventy to eighty percent of all applicants rather than the previous 
system’s two to three percent admission rate.70  The passage rate rose in 
2009, but only to 27.6 percent.71 
In 1996, the Japanese Diet reworked the Civil Procedure Code,72 
which was last amended in 2006.73  The Code’s revisions include additional 
discovery mechanisms and simplification of small claims procedures.74  
These revisions imply that Japan has begun a transition to improve legal 
tools for plaintiffs.75 
The changes to the judicial and law school systems show that the 
Japanese government wants its legal system to accommodate today’s legal 
needs.  The changes have a large impact on the Japanese legal system.  
Though the new law school system did not create the seventy percent exam 
                                                      
63  Id. at 303. 
64  Id. at 313 (citing REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 5, at ch. III, pt. 2, §1). 
65  Id. at 318. 
66  Id. at 311. 
67  Id. at 309. 
68  Id. at 310. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 312; Bruce E. Aronson, The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan Revisited: Proceedings 
of a Panel Discussion on the Japanese Legal Profession After the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2011 
Tohoku Earthquake, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 255, 272 (2012). 
71  Id. 
72  MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996 (Japan), translated in http://www.oapi.wipo. 
net/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8909 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
73  Id. 
74  Goodman 2001, supra note 38, at 797. 
75  Others have argued that factors such as economic liberalization and fragmentation of political 
authority have contributed to this transition.  See Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 38, at 271-72. 
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passage rate that the Reform Council expected, the jump from three percent 
to twenty-six percent is sizeable.  This has led some commentators to 
conclude that “the Japanese legal profession has emerged form its insularity 
and limited social role.”76  This legal transformation will have wide-reaching 
impact on Japanese business and society. 
B. Before Group Action, there was Joinder, Consolidation, and the Sentei 
Tojisha Rule 
Until the new class action law was promulgated on December 11, 
2013, 77  Japan utilized various systems to replicate group litigation. 78  
Consumer groups could file for injunctions on behalf of a consumer class79 
but they could not recover damages for consumers.80  Japan has also relied 
on a more established system of joinder.81  Under Article 38 of the Japanese 
Code of Civil Procedure, when the rights or liabilities for an action are the 
same and are based on the same kinds of facts and law, then those harmed 
may sue as co-litigants.82  This rule is the Japanese version of joinder and 
may be used for small or large numbers of litigants.83 
Litigation using joinder procedure is difficult, as courts must name 
and give notice to each plaintiff individually.84  The system is not structured 
to accommodate large numbers of plaintiffs.  Additionally, using the joinder 
procedure is at the court’s discretion; the court may instead choose to issue 
individual judgments or settlements. 85  This discretion may create 
inconsistent results.  Courts treat Japanese plaintiffs filing group actions less 
like a group and more like individual plaintiffs. 86   This treatment is 
significant, as Japanese lower court judges face a huge caseload and could 
benefit from increased judicial efficiency.87  While joinder allows several 
                                                      
76  Aronson, supra note 70, at 285. 
77  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1.   
78  See generally Goodman 2004, supra note 1; Goodman 2001, supra note 38; Nancy L. Young, 
Japan’s New Products Liability Law: Increased Protection for Consumers, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
J. 893, 900-01 (1996). 
79  Sugawara, supra note 8, at 20. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 4. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  Ikuo Sugawara, Japan, 622 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 280, 281 (2009). 
85  Id. 
86  See Sugawara, supra note 8, at 5 (“When this method is adopt[ed] . . . authorization from each 
individual party is required.”). 
87  John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and Public Trust, in 
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYS., supra note 39, at 129, 131. 
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hundred plaintiffs to join a complaint,88 it creates complicated and difficult 
legal situations.  This is problematic because “depending on the contents of 
the evidence and the progress of the trial, there is no guarantee that the 
contents of judgments will be the same for the parties and settlements or 
withdraw of claims may also happen.  Separate appeals to the judgments 
may also occur.”89  Varying judgments or settlements are not ideal because 
they could create inconsistency in the legal system.  Additionally, separate 
appeals increase the workload of, and costs to, the judiciary.  Although 
attorneys have been able to use joinder in the absence of a formal class 
action system, a formalized system could bring more stability and certainty 
to the legal system. 
 Japanese attorneys have used two other methods of group action 
without the benefit of class action.  These are seikyu no heigou (judicial 
consolidation)90 and the sentei tojisha rule (chosen party system).91  If all of 
the plaintiffs’ claims are in one court, that court has the ability to consolidate 
oral arguments.92   Consolidation is not always feasible, particularly in 
consumer products liability cases, because “[g]iven today’s mass production 
and advanced distribution systems . . . users of any single product are likely 
to be spread out among many districts.”93  This diffusion could preclude 
plaintiffs from using consolidation, as the claims are not likely to be in the 
same court.94 
The sentei tojisha rule, enabled by Article 47 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure,95 allows a single party to act as the representative on behalf of all 
plaintiffs.96  All plaintiffs must authorize the representative party.97  Further, 
the decision given to the representative party applies to all group members 
through the principle of res judicata.98  This approach puts the power of 
litigation into the hands of one party99 and increases the likelihood that the 
other plaintiffs will either be displeased with the result or discouraged from 
joining the representative litigation in the first place.100  Although the sentei 
tojisha rule creates consistent outcomes for plaintiffs, the rule has been 
                                                      
88  See Sugawara, supra note 8, at 4. 
89  Id. at 5. 
90  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 1. 
91  REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 5, at § 7(4)(b). 
92  Young, supra note 78, at 900. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. at 901. 
96  Id. 
97  Id.  
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
100  See id. 
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ineffective as a means of providing relief for large numbers of plaintiffs; 
usually, sentei tojisha representation results in a small group of plaintiffs.101 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF JAPANESE CLASS ACTION LAW  
 This Part looks at the most recent developments in Japanese class 
action law.  It begins by discussing the creation of the Consumer Affairs 
Agency in 2009 and the 2012 proposed class action legislation.  After 
discussing the components of the proposed law, it examines the law as it was 
passed in December 2013.  Later, the comment argues that Japan should 
look to the U.S. class action system to examine the benefits of class actions 
as well as the potential legal complications they can create. 
 
A. The Consumer Affairs Agency Class Action Proposal 
The Japanese government created the Consumer Affairs Agency 
(“CAA”) in September 2009.102   This agency is a central system for 
investigating consumer complaints.103  It was formed as a result of several 
failures by the Japanese government to address public safety concerns, such 
as an illegal distribution of tainted rice, carbon monoxide poisoning from 
gas water heaters, and poisoning from certain imported foods.104  In 2010, 
the agency began searching for a solution to Japan’s disjointed class action 
system.105  The CAA formed a study group composed of academics, which 
proposed four options for a potential class action system.106 
The CAA officially proposed a new class action system for Japan in 
2012.107  The proposed legislation, called the “Litigation System Relating to 
                                                      
101  Id. 
102  For a Society with Security, Safety, and Comfortable Living, CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY 3 2010, 
www.caa.go.jp/en/pdf/caa.pdf. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  New Report by the Consumer Affairs Agency Suggests Class Actions May be Coming to Japan, 
CLIENT ALERT 1 (DLA Piper Tokyo Partnership) (Sept. 2010) (on file with author). 
106  Id. 
107  See Comments of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform on the Consumer Affairs Agency’s 
Proposal entitled Litigation System Relating to Recovering Damages for a Consumer Class, U.S. 
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Japan_-
_ILR_Comments_to_CAA_CA_proposal_9-3-2012.pdf (last visited May 23, 2014); see generally Shōhi 
seikatsu ni kansuru kihon-tekina seido ya kankyō-dzukuri o susumemasu (消費生活に関する基本的な制
度や環境づくりを進めます) [The Litigation System Proposed in Accordance with Collective Consumer 
Damage Recovery], SHŌHISHACHŌ ( 消 費 者 庁 ) [CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY], 
http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/index12.html (last visited May 23, 2014) [hereinafter CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
AGENCY System Proposal]. 
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Recovering Damages for a Consumer Class,” 108  was a much-needed, 
comprehensive plan of action.  To ensure the creation of a class action 
system appropriate for Japan, the CAA conducted several surveys and 
reports on the class action systems in various countries.109  These countries 
included the United Kingdom, Portugal, South Korea, the United States, 
Germany, France, Canada, and Brazil.110  The department created an initial 
plan for the class action system and allowed a one-month public comment 
period that ended in September 2012.111  The comments enabled the CAA to 
better address concerns of opinions from consumers and businesses directly 
impacted by the proposed class action system.112 
 The 2012 proposal would have altered existing procedure governed by 
the Consumer Contract Act.113  This act, which came into effect in April 
2001, aims to “protect the interests of consumers, and thereby contribute to 
the stabilization of and the improvement in the general welfare and life of 
the citizens . . . ”114  Pursuant to these goals, the Act was amended in 2007 to 
allow for the creation and certification of Qualified Consumer Organizations 
(“QCO”).115  A QCO is certified by the Prime Minister116 and is given the 
power to sue for injunctive relief on behalf of consumers. 117  There are 
currently only eleven organizations certified as QCOs.118  The 2012 proposal 
                                                      
108 Japan, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
international/japan (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
109  The CAA has a sample of surveys and reports conducted on the collective consumer damage 
systems, including the United States, Canada, Germany, and Brazil.  SHŌHISHACHŌ (消費者庁 ) 
[CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY], http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/index.html#m01-1 (last visited May 24, 
2014).  
110  Id. 
111   CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY System Proposal, supra note 107. 
112  Id. 
113  See Shōhishakeiyakuhō [The Consumer Contract Act], available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-
bin/idxselect.cgi?IDX_OPT=1&H_NAME=%8f%c1%94%ef%8e%d2&H_NAME_YOMI=%82%a0&H_
NO_GENGO=H&H_NO_YEAR=&H_NO_TYPE=2&H_NO_NO=&H_FILE_NAME=H12HO061&H_R
YAKU=1&H_CTG=1&H_YOMI_GUN=1&H_CTG_GUN=1 (Japan), translated in http://www.consumer. 
go.jp/english/cca/index.html#3-2 [hereinafter Consumer Contract Act translation]. 
114  Id. 
115  Sugawara, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
116  The Prime Minister has the authority to certify QCOs under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
Consumer Contract Act.  Consumer Contract Act translation, supra note 113, at art. 2 (4). 
117  Id. at art. 13(1). 
118  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2. 
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allowed a Specified Qualified Consumer Organization (“SQCO”)119 to begin 
the class action process.120 
The proposal included two stages.121  In the first stage, a SQCO would 
file the lawsuit on consumers’ behalf and ask the court to determine 
common issues of law and fact.122  Only a certified SQCO could file the 
class action lawsuit123 and could file the lawsuit only against business 
operators. 124   Consumers could affect only the initial class action 
proceedings indirectly.  Under the proposal, the SQCO could only bring four 
types of legal claims against the defendants:  1) unjust enrichment resulting 
from cancellation of a Consumer Contract; 2) performance of a Consumer 
Contract; 3) tort liability under the Civil Code; and 4) default of a Consumer 
Contract or product defect under a Consumer Contract.125  The proposal 
limited claims to monetary relief and made criminal charges unavailable.126  
Once the lawsuit and charges were filed, the SQCO would have to prove 
three elements.  First, the SQCO would have to show numerosity—that is, 
that a significant number of consumers were affected.  Second, they would 
need to prove commonality.  That is, that the damages suffered by the 
consumers resulted from the same cause.  Third, the common issues between 
the consumers would have to be “dominant,” and the SQCO would have to 
demonstrate that the consumers clearly had claims.127 
 If the SQCO succeeded at trial on the common issues, then the lawsuit 
would move to the second stage.128  The second stage constituted a damages 
phase where individual consumers harmed by the defendants could step 
                                                      
119  As is explained in the next section, the new class action law as promulgated establishes Specified 
Qualified Consumer Organizations (SQCO).  The difference between a QCO and SQCO is in their fee 
structure.  Some sources refer to SQCOs as Certified Qualified Consumer Organizations, which appears to 
be a translation difference.  For the purposes of this comment, the author refers to these organizations as 
SQCOs. 
120  An editorial in The Japan Times notes that “[a]s of January 2013, some 30 consumer lawsuits had 
been filed.  But consumer organizations do not have enough funds and experts to file and continue class-
action lawsuits.”  Protecting Consumers Against Fraud, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/01/13/editorials/protecting-consumers-against-fraud/#. 
UzJVrq1dV3Y [hereinafter JAPAN TIMES Fraud]. 
121  Kozo Kawai et al., Japan, in THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REV. 254 (Ilene 
Knable Gotts ed., 5th ed. 2012), available at http://www.jurists.co.jp/ja/publication/tractate/docs/PCER_ 
Fifth.pdf; Japanese Class Action Legislation – How to Protect your Business, THE AM. CHAMBER OF COM. 
IN JAPAN, Nov 12, 2012, http://accj.tajera.com/en/events/details/19340-japanese-class-action-legislation-
how-to-protect-your-business (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). 
122  ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 2. 
123  Id. 
124  Id.  
125  Id. at 4. 
126  See id. 
127  Id. at 5. 
128  Id. at 2. 
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forward and receive damages.129  This stage also included a trial for the 
individual issues that arose as the consumers claimed damages.130  The 
SQCO would provide public notice for consumers to participate in the 
second stage, and it would be the responsibility of each individual to step 
forward.131  The second stage would be a de facto opt-in132 form of class 
action, where those who failed to opt in would be excluded from the results 
of the proceedings.  The court would issue a decision at the end of the 
second stage, choosing to issue an injunction, award damages, or do 
nothing.133  After the decision, the parties would then turn to the usual 
litigation process.134 
 
B. The Japanese Government Passes a Class Action Law 
 On April 19, 2013, the Japanese Cabinet approved the class action 
proposal and sent it to the Shugi-in (the Japanese House of Representatives) 
for debate and a vote.135  The class action law, the Act on Special Provisions 
of Civil Court Procedures for Collective Recovery of Property Damage of 
Consumers (Act No. 96 of 2013),136 was promulgated on December 11, 
2013.137  The law is set to take effect in 2016, three years after its passage by 
the Diet.138  Not everyone is pleased with the law.  Before the Cabinet 
passed it, Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) issued a joint statement 
with the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in opposition of the 
                                                      
129  Id. 
130  See id. at 6 (“If the business operator disputes the amount or existence of any or all of the 
consumers’ claims as contained in the SQCO’s notice, the court will issue a decision relating to the amount 
or existence of the various consumers’ claims.”). 
131  Id. at 4, 6. 
132  U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 108. 
133  See ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
134  Id. 
135  Japanese Litigation Update, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP 9, Dec. 9, 2013, 
http://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/469099/december%202013%20business%20litigation%20report.pdf; 
Editorial, Consumer Protection System, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 28, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/ 
opinion/2013/04/28/editorials/consumer-protection-system/#.Upx8p2RDt3Z (last visited May 17, 2014); 
Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 4. 
136  2013 Class Action Law, supra note 7; ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6. 
137  Act on Special Provisions of court proceedings for civil recovery of the collective property of the 
casualties of the consumer, CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY, http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/index14.html 
(last visited May 23, 2014); Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1. 
138  SHŌHISHACHŌ (消費者庁) [CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY], SHŌHISHA NO ZAISAN-TEKI HIGAI NO 
SHŪDAN-TEKINA KAIFUKU NO TAME NO MINJI NO SAIBAN TETSUDZUKI NO TOKUREI NI KANSURU HŌRITSU NI 
TSUITE (消費者の財産的被害の集団的な回復のための民事の裁判手続の特例に関する法律につい
て) [FOR THE ACT ON SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF CIVIL COURT PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTIVE RECOVERY OF 
PROPERTY DAMAGE OF CONSUMERS], available at http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/pdf/130419-
0_131213.pdf. 
JUNE 2014  THE NEW CLASS ACTIONS IN JAPAN  809 
 
proposal.139  Keidanren, a large Japanese organization comprised of 1,300 
Japanese companies, debates political issues that are of interest to those 
companies.140  Members of the Japanese business community have resisted 
class action laws as “[s]etting a class-action precedent would . . . be a 
nightmare for Japanese companies[.]”141  As SQCOs file class action suits on 
behalf of consumers, it follows that the natural defendants of such 
lawsuits—businesses—will resist new laws expanding the potential for those 
lawsuits.  The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform issued a twelve-
page statement on the potential dangers and problems that may arise from 
Japan’s proposal.142  The statement attacks central elements of class action 
systems generally, saying that class action lawsuits are “inherently more 
vulnerable to abuse than individual lawsuits.”143 
 Others, such as the editorial staff of The Japan Times, endorsed the 
Cabinet’s proposal.144  Proponents of the law argued it will allow injured 
consumers to receive compensation for harm done to them, whereas the 
previous laws only enabled them to receive injunctive relief.145  Further, they 
argued that class action lawsuits and SQCOs’ augmented ability to seek 
damages can “establish meaningful precedents” and “work . . . more 
efficiently for the overall public good.”146  Consumers International, a pro-
consumer group, argued that the new proposal “ha[s] features specifically 
designed to prevent abuse[.]”147   Further, proponents note the provision that 
binds all QCOs to first-stage judicial decisions148 will “prevent multiple 
lawsuits on the same issue.”149 
 While the Consumer Contract Act first created QCOs in 2007,150 the 
2012 proposal151  and the 2013 class action law establish tekikakushou 
                                                      
139  Urgent Proposition on the Japanese Class Action System (Shudan Sosho Seido), KEIDANDREN, 
Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/2013/023.html (last visited May 17, 2014). 
140  About KEIDANREN, KEIDANDREN, http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/pro001.html (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
141  Tomohiro Osaki, U.S.-style class action? Unlikely for Tepco Suits, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, 
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/05/reference/u-s-style-class-action-unlikely-for-
tepco-suits/#.Uo6rSGR4aDk (last visited May 17, 2014). 
142  U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 107. 
143  Id. at 2. 
144  Consumer Protection System, supra note 135. 
145  Id. 
146  Id.  
147  Japan Government Considers Group Action Plan, CONSUMERS INT’L, Apr. 10, 2013, http://www. 
consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/news/2013/04/japan/#.UsHv-2RDt3Y (last visited May 17, 
2014). 
148  Japanese Litigation Update, supra note 135, at 9. 
149  Id. 
150  Sugawara, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
151  ANDERSON MŌRI & TOMOTSUNE, supra note 6, at 2. 
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hishadantai (Specified Qualified Consumer Organizations) (“SQCO”).152  
Some have speculated that the existing QCOs will be designated SQCOs 
under the new law.153  The difference between QCOs and SQCOs is found in 
their fee structure.  The new law incentivizes SQCOs to bring more 
lawsuits.154  A QCO cannot charge fees for its litigation, whereas a SQCO is 
allowed to receive fees and costs from class members who reach the second 
stage of litigation.155  The new law allows SQCOs to bring five types of 
claims, called Kyotsuu gimu (common obligations)156: 
 
a) claims for performance based on contractual obligations, b) 
claims for unjust enrichment, c) claims for damages caused by 
defaults on contractual obligations, d) claims for damages due 
to product defect liability, and e) claims for damages caused by 
unlawful acts (Fuhoukoui).157 
 
The new law cannot be used for all types of recovery.  Recovery for kakudai 
songai (consequential damages), jinshinsongai (physical injury), isharyou 
(pain and suffering), and lost profits are not available under the new law.158 
 The new law retains the two-stage approach included in the 2012 
proposal.159  The SQCO files the lawsuit in the first stage,160 wherein “the 
court will render a declaratory judgment on the common liabilities of the 
accused business operator[.]”161  If the court renders its judgment in favor of 
the SQCO, the process moves to the second stage, where damages are 
determined for individual consumers.162  In the second stage, the SQCO and 
the defendant, upon the SQCO’s request, provide notice to potential 
claimants.163  The claimants then allow the SQCO to present their claims 
before the court.164  The court allows the defendant to approve or reject the 
claims—if the claims are approved, then the claimants succeed and the 
                                                      
152  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id.  
158  Id. 
159  Id.  
160  See id.; Takeho Ujino, Japan: New Class Action System, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 24, 2014, 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3322767/Japan-New-class-action-system.html (last visited May 7, 2014); 
JAPAN TIMES Fraud, supra note 120. 
161  Ujino, supra note 160. 
162  Id. 
163  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 3. 
164  Id.; Ujino, supra note 160. 
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litigation ends.165  If the claims are rejected, the court follows a “Simplified 
Determination Procedure,” only examining documentary evidence.166  “If the 
consumer objects to a determination reached in a Simplified Determination 
Procedure, then the case tracks ordinary litigation procedure.”167 
 Some expect that the introduction of class actions will increase 
Japanese courts’ caseloads.168  Larger caseloads may necessitate an increase 
in the number of Japanese attorneys169 and could fundamentally change the 
structure of the Japanese legal system.  An increase in attorneys and 
litigation, coupled with a pro-consumer perspective, may change the 
Japanese public’s perception of the legal system from a shameful option of 
last resort to a more acceptable method of dispute resolution.  As Japan 
implements its new class action law, Japan should look to the U.S. system to 
examine potential benefits and drawbacks to class action litigation.  As the 
new law has provisions similar to those found in the United States,170 this 
comparison is appropriate.  The recent passage of Japan’s class action law 
allows this author to present developing U.S. class action case law in a 
unique and meaningful way.  Japan can examine U.S. case law to anticipate 
where problems interpreting or applying the new class action law may arise. 
IV. CLASS ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Class action litigation in the United States is well developed171 and 
supported by numerous court decisions and statutes.172  As explained below, 
the United States provides an important and practical base for developing 
Japan’s class action system.  Indeed, some aspects of Japan’s new law have 
apparent similarities to U.S. law.173  For example, the U.S. legal system also 
imposes requirements of commonality and numerosity for class actions.174  
                                                      
165  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 3. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  Ida Torres, Government Passes Measure for Class-Sction Lawsuits to Seek Monetary Damage, 
JAPAN DAILY PRESS, May 24, 2013, http://japandailypress.com/government-passes-measure-for-class-
action-lawsuits-to-seek-monetary-damage-2429465/ (last visited May 17, 2014). 
169  Id. 
170  See Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing “Common Obligations” and stating that 
“claims [must] relate to damages owed to a ‘considerably large number of persons.’”). 
171  James Cooper, Class Action Issues, REACTIONS, Dec. 2011, available at http://www.clydeco. 
com/uploads/Files/Publications/2012/1112_Legal_analysis.pdf. 
172  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 USCA § 1711 (2005); 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 
(1974); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
173  Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing “Common Obligations” and stating that 
“claims [must] relate to damages owed to a ‘considerably large number of persons.’”). 
174  See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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This Part briefly explains class action lawsuits in the United States, 
ultimately recommending that Japan should examine portions of U.S. class 
action laws in order to aid introduction of its new law. 
A. Purpose of Class Action Lawsuits 
  Generally speaking, there are three widely accepted purposes of a 
class action system:  access to justice, efficiency (judicial economy), and 
deterrence. 175   Class action lawsuits enable plaintiffs to participate in 
lawsuits that are otherwise financially impracticable.176  When a plaintiff 
suffers minimal damages, filing a lawsuit may prove financially 
infeasible.177  This comment argues that the stress and costs of a lawsuit may 
understandably deter a person from filing a lawsuit where they have little to 
no financial incentives.  Class actions allow plaintiffs to spread “litigation 
costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.”178  The class action 
allows these plaintiffs to participate (though minimally) in the legal process 
and recover for small, but meaningful, wrongs done to them.179 
 Class action systems also promote efficiency180 and consistency in the 
judicial system. 181   An incident harming thousands of people could 
substantially tax the legal system if the plaintiffs each filed individual 
complaints and demanded individual results.182  Numerous problems arise 
                                                      
175  Richard A. Nagareda et al., THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIG. 25-26 
(2d ed. 2013); Catherine Piché, Cultural Analysis of Class Action Law, 2 J. OF CIVIL L. STUDIES, 101, 103 
(2009); Class Actions in Canada: A Guide for Defendants, MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT 3 (2002), 
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=wc-yMkw9pbcC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f= 
false; THE Y.B. OF CONSUMER LAW 2008 299 (Christian Twigg-Flesner et al. eds., 2008) available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=KQBGqoBP-68C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
176  See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[C]lass actions often involve 
‘an aggregation of small individual claims, where a large number of claims are required to make it 
economical to bring suit.’”) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985)). 
177  MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT, supra note 175, at 3. 
178  U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980). 
179  For example, the Federal Trade Commission settled claims with Airborne and Walgreens 
regarding misleading advertising on dietary supplements.  See Airborne Cold Remedy Settles Suit For 
$30M, CBS 
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/08/14/health/main4350532. 
shtml?source=RSSattr=Health_4350532; FTC Tells Consumers They May Be Due a Refund If They 
Purchased Walgreens “Wal-Born” Cold and Flu Supplements, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Nov. 1, 2012, 
http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/11/walgreens.shtm (last visited May 17, 2014). 
180  TIMOTHY D. COHELAN, COHELAN ON CAL. CLASS ACTIONS § 1.04 (2001); see Nagareda et al., 
supra note 175, at 25-26. 
181  Farah Z. Usmani, Inequities in the Resolution of Securities Disputes: Individual or Class Action; 
Arbitration or Litigation, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 193, 206-07 n.107 (2001). 
182  See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1270 (stating that “[h]olding separate trials for claims that could be tried 
together ‘would be costly, inefficient, and would burden the court system’ by forcing individual plaintiffs 
to repeatedly prove the same facts and make the same legal arguments before different courts”) (quoting In 
re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 220 F.R.D. 672, 700 (S.D. Fl. 2004)). 
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from this scenario.  Courts would waste time sorting through the same fact 
pattern multiple times, and litigants would be dissatisfied as different courts 
may reach different conclusions.183  Combining similar cases into a single 
action saves the judiciary time and provides a consistent result.184  Providing 
parties with consistency can protect the reputation of the judicial system.  
Additionally, filing the suit as a single action protects judges from an 
overwhelming workload; court systems may be busy enough without the 
additional, duplicative claims.185 
 Class action suits deter harmful behavior towards consumers.186  With 
the threat of a class action lawsuit and the potential for large fees and 
damages awards, this comment argues that companies have incentives to 
avoid class action lawsuits altogether.  Companies may find that they can 
best avoid class action lawsuits if they avoid causing harm to consumers, or 
potential plaintiffs, in the first place.  In a successful class action lawsuit, the 
defendant may have to pay substantial amounts of money.187  In addition to 
their own legal expenses, they may be liable for the plaintiffs’ legal 
expenses,188 treble damages,189 and potential fines for illegal activity.190  As 
these cases may involve several attorneys, and the harm to plaintiffs may be 
substantial, class action lawsuits may prove disastrous for defendants.  Even 
the threat of a class action lawsuit can deter a potential wrongdoer.191 
                                                      
183  See id. 
184  Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402-03 (1980) (stating that “[t]he justifications that led to the development 
of the class action include the protection of the defendant from inconsistent obligations . . . ”); Klay, 382 
F.3d at 1270 (explaining that “class actions ‘offer . . . substantial economies of time . . . ’”) (quoting In re 
Terazosin Hydrochloride, 220 F.R.D. at 700). 
185  See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1270. 
186  See John C. Coffee Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its 
Implementation (COLUM. L. AND ECON., Working Paper No. 293, 2006). 
187  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (jury award of USD 5 billion reduced 
on appeal). 
188  Adele Nicholas, The Changing Class Action Litigation Landscape (Aug. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/08/05/the-changing-class-action-litigation-landscape (observing that 
“[t]he cost to defend a class action suit can be astronomical, and many statutes allow the lawyers for 
prevailing class plaintiffs to recover their attorneys’ fees from the defendant”). 
189  Lynn H. Pasahow et al., TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY 9 (1987), available at http://books.google. 
com/books?id=ToFquxup3SoC&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false (last visited May 8, 2014) 
(noting that “[a] treble-damages claim may proceed as a class action if the usual requirements of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are met”). 
190  Dana Rosenfeld & Daniel Blynn, The “Prior Substantiation” Doctrine: An Important Check On 
the Piggyback Class Action, 2011, available at http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1537 
(explaining that “there is nothing to prevent a private litigant from filing suit against a consumer product 
advertiser or manufacturer after a regulatory agency takes action against the same company and obtains 
redress for consumers”). 
191  MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT, supra note 175, at 3-4. 
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B. The Structure of the United States’ Class Action System  
The structure of class action lawsuits in the United States is relatively 
straightforward.  A class action complaint in the United States typically 
contains one or more of the following causes of action: a consumer rights 
claim, a securities and antitrust claim, an environmental claim, a mass torts 
claim, or a civil rights claim.192  Named plaintiffs file these claims on behalf 
of the class.193  The named plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit may receive a 
financial incentive for acting as class representatives.194  The class itself may 
contain hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs.195   
U.S. class actions begin with the certification process.196  In the 
United States, the class action is either allowed to proceed or it ends due to a 
failed certification.197  In the U.S., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) 
and (b) set forth the threshold requirements for class certification.198  Rule 
23(a) sets out four requirements:  1) numerosity; 2) commonality; 3) 
typicality; and 4) adequacy.199  In more detail, these requirements state: 
 
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.200  
 
                                                      
192  Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States, CONF. 
ON DEBATES OVER GROUP LITIG. IN COMP. PERSP. 3 (2000), available at http://law.duke.edu/grouplit/ 
papers/classactionalexander.pdf. 
193 See Class Action: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST. (LII), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/class_ 
action (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
194 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An 
Empirical Study 3 (N.Y.U. L. & ECON., Working Paper, 2005) available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=nyu_lewp.  It is notable that named plaintiffs face costs such as 
opportunity costs of time, stress related to the case, and risks of retaliation or harm to reputation when they 
act as named plaintiffs.  These costs explain why named plaintiffs may receive financial compensation for 
their role.  Id. 
195  Class Actions Overview: The Basics of Class Actions, JUSTIA, http://www.justia.com/trials-
litigation/class-actions/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Class Action Overview]. 
196  See Alexander, supra note 192, at 6. 
197  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
198  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
199  Id. at 23(a); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Duke, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011); 
Alexander, supra note 192, at 4. 
200  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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Courts will not certify a class if the plaintiffs fail to meet one of these 
factors.201 
 Although these requirements seem simple, this comment argues that 
they can create complications for plaintiffs and courts.  Plaintiffs who do not 
follow the class action requirements face the possibility of having their case 
dismissed.202  Courts that do not adhere stringently to the certification 
process may face an overwhelming and complicated lawsuit, requiring the 
court to pay significant attention to individualized facts and thus removing 
many of the benefits of class action litigation.203  Combined, Rule 23(a)’s 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements aim to 
protect the interests of the class members and ensure that joining plaintiffs’ 
claims reduce the workload of judges.204 
Once a court certifies the class, the named plaintiffs and their 
attorneys provide notice to all unnamed plaintiffs who belong to the class.205  
The unnamed plaintiffs are persons who suffered some harm in the same 
manner or incident as the named plaintiffs, but are not required to appear in 
court to individually prove the harm they suffered. 206   The unnamed 
plaintiffs may rely on the named plaintiffs to proceed with the lawsuit.207  
Courts automatically consider unnamed plaintiffs members of the class, but 
as explained below, sometimes give unnamed plaintiffs the opportunity to 
opt out of the class litigation.208  Once the class litigation concludes and if 
the class is victorious, the unnamed plaintiffs who have not opted out may 
receive compensation for the harm they suffered.209 
 After meeting the basic requirements of Rule 23(a), a class must meet 
one of four criteria listed under Rule 23(b).210  Rule 23(b) is used to specify 
what type of class action is filed, including a suit where notice is optional, a 
limited fund action, a civil rights action, or a suit for damages.211  Not all 
                                                      
201  Id. 
202  See Alexander, supra note 192, at 6. 
203  “Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of 
common answers.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131–32 (2009) [hereinafter Nagareda 
2009]). 
204  See Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 25-26. 
205  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).  Notice requirements differ for 23(b)(1)-(2) classes and 23(b)(3) classes.  
If the class is a 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class, “the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.”  For a 
23(b)(3) class, “the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances . . . ”  Id. 
206  Class Action Overview, supra note 195. 
207  See id. 
208  Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2558; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
209  See Class Action Overview, supra note 195. 
210  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
211  Id. 
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lawsuits are suitable for each category.  A suit where notice is optional under 
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is appropriate where inconsistent adjudications would 
result in standards of conduct that are incompatible for parties defendants.212  
Such a class may only seek declaratory or injunctive relief and cannot seek 
compensatory damages.213  Further, class members may not opt out of the 
class.214  Once the class is certified, all qualified members of the class are 
included; this is necessary because inconsistent adjudicatory results would 
impose inconsistent obligations on the defendant.215 
 The second category of class action lawsuits is a limited fund suit.216  
These are properly certified when adjudications made to individual members 
of a class would be dispositive to the interests of the other class members.217  
These suits likewise do not allow class members to opt out.218  For example, 
imagine a limited fund class containing one hundred plaintiffs, with a total 
of USD 100,000.  When individual damages are assessed, each individual is 
claiming USD 10,000.  This means USD 1,000,000 in damages is claimed, 
but only USD 100,000 is available to satisfy those claims.  If each plaintiff 
were to receive the amount they are fully entitled to from the fund, the fund 
would only support ten plaintiffs fully and leave the remaining ninety 
plaintiffs with nothing.  A limited fund suit ensures that each class members’ 
interests are partially protected, and that no single class member receives 
compensation to the detriment of another class member.219  Each class 
member is treated equitably. 
 The third category is for civil rights lawsuits. 220  Rule 23(b)(2) 
provides that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act,” 
making injunctive or declarative relief appropriate.221  Plaintiffs used this 
type of class action through the 1970s and 1980s to enforce federal welfare 
and civil rights laws.222  Under Rule 23(b)(2), plaintiffs may maintain 
lawsuits for monetary relief, but this relief must be incidental.223   
                                                      
212  Id. at (1)(A). 
213  See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROC. STATE AND FED. CASES AND 
MATERIALS 800 (10th ed. 2009). 
214  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) & (3)(A); HAZARD, supra note 213, at 800. 
215  HAZARD, supra note 213, at 800. 
216  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B); Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 26, 219, 240. 
217  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
218  Id. at 23(c)(2)(A) & (3)(A); HAZARD, supra note 213, at 800. 
219  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B); Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 26, 219, 240. 
220  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 190-91. 
221  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
222  Thomas R. Grande, Innovative Class Action Techniques–The Use of Rule 23(b)(2) in Consumer 
Class Actions, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 251, 252 (2002). 
223  See HAZARD, supra note 213, at 801. 
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The final category of class action lawsuits encompasses damages class 
actions.224  In these lawsuits, “the primary function of subsection (b)(3) has 
been to provide an aggregation device for damages suits, and most class 
actions in which damages are sought are (b)(3) rather than (b)(1) or (b)(2) 
suits.”225  Matters brought under Rule 23(b)(3) are subject to additional 
requirements not demanded of other class action lawsuits.226  These include 
the predominance and superiority requirements. 227  The predominance 
requirement demands that class-wide questions by the class predominate 
over any individual questions that class members may have. 228   This 
comment discusses the predominance requirement further in the next section, 
in the context of Wal-Mart v. Dukes229 and McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch.230  
The superiority requirement mandates that a class action lawsuit must be the 
superior form of adjudicating the matter.231  Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) provide a 
list of factors for the judge to consider when evaluating superiority, 
including whether individuals should control their own case, the extent of 
litigation already underway, the desirability of concentrating litigation in a 
particular forum, the difficulties in managing the matter as a class action, 
and possible alternatives to a class action lawsuit.232 
C. Tradeoffs in the United States’ Class Action System 
Class action lawsuits disrupt the traditional American litigation 
narrative. 233   For example, “[a] fundamental premise of American 
adjudicative structures is that clients, not their counsel, define litigation 
objectives.”234  The American class action system turns this premise on its 
head.  Class actions facilitate litigation for a massive number of individual 
claims but forgo the opportunity and benefits of litigating claims 
individually.235  Class action invites the possibility that “the lawyer [will] 
represent[] an aggregation of litigants with unstable, inchoate, or conflicting 
preferences.”236  Class actions sacrifice individualized remedies in order to 
                                                      
224  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 92. 
225  HAZARD, supra note 213, at 821. 
226  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
227  Id. 
228  Id. 
229  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548 (2011). 
230  McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012). 
231  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
232  Id. at (A)-(D). 
233  See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1982). 
234  Id.  
235  See id. 
236  Id. 
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afford plaintiffs the opportunity to shift focus to structural reforms237 and 
institutional practices. 238  For example, the 1966 reform to the class action 
portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure aided plaintiffs in litigating 
public, rather than private, issues.239 
Litigants and courts in the United States traditionally justify class 
action lawsuits based on economic efficiencies, viewing them as a practical 
means of providing litigation for claimants.240  In many instances, “[t]he 
effect of the conduct under attack on any single individual is too small to 
justify a traditional lawsuit seeking compensation.  But in the aggregate the 
impact is substantial enough to be a target for redress . . .”241  This system 
creates a tradeoff for plaintiffs.  Though the system gives claimants the 
opportunity to bring suit for otherwise financially impractical causes, 
plaintiffs may lack control over their attorneys.242  Moreover, class actions 
may overlook certain subgroups within the class.243  Still, class action 
lawsuits make more information available to the courts; such information 
results from the added resources of having several parties and attorneys 
involved in the dispute. 244   Providing judges with greater access to 
information is an example of an economic efficiency that class action 
lawsuits can provide. 
Class actions are important because they provide individuals with a 
collective problem the opportunity to be heard.  As Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Richard Posner stated, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class 
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a 
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”245  Still, some argue that modern class 
actions, particularly in the mass tort context, shield defendants and provide 
                                                      
237  Rhode, supra note 233, at 1186. 
238  One area where class actions have been particularly effective is “institutional litigation.”  These 
lawsuits typically seek to rearrange some aspect of a public institution, such as in a prison or a school, and 
require ongoing judicial supervision of the determined remedy.  Id. at 1184 (“[I]nstitutional reform class 
actions have made and continue to make an enormous contribution to the realization of fundamental 
constitutional values—a contribution that no other governmental construct has proven able to duplicate.”); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467-68 (1980). 
239  Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5-6 (1982). 
240  See id. at 28; Nagareda et al., supra note 175, at 25-26. 
241  Chayes, supra note 239, at 27. 
242  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1343, 1346 (1995).  But see Rhode, supra note 233, at 1205 (stating that “many attorneys make 
considerable efforts to appreciate and accommodate the broadest possible spectrum of class sentiment”). 
243 Rhode, supra note 233, at 1224. 
244 See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 146 (2011); see David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation 
Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 852 (2002). 
245 Carnegie v. Household Intern., Inc., 376 F.3d. 656, 661 (2004) (emphasis in original). 
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“a means by which unsuspecting future claimants suffer the extinction of 
their claims even before they learn of their injury.”246  In the mass tort 
context, this argument is supported by courts’ willingness to accept 
settlement agreements of dubious value, attorneys’ fees inducements, and 
passivity of persons whose harm has not yet arisen.247 
Another concern with class action lawsuits in the United States is how 
settlement agreements are paid out.248  Coupon settlements, where class 
members are given discounted prices off of products or services,249 could 
potentially leave class members with “awards of little or no value.”250  Such 
settlements may leave plaintiffs in the unpleasant position that their 
attorneys would receive fees in cash, while plaintiffs themselves would 
receive coupons redeemable with the company being sued.251  While the 
passage of the United States’ Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 may have 
lessened coupon settlement abuses,252 other concerns remain.  For instance, 
in the certification stage, plaintiffs must struggle to determine the numeric 
limit of class membership, as having too many class members will attract 
judicial scrutiny amid concerns of predominating individual issues. 253  
Recent Supreme Court decisions show that the plaintiffs’ sword is blunted at 
best.254 
The next section explores how the American Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and U.S. case law are relevant to the creation of a Japanese class 
action system.  Examining U.S. case law highlights legal confusion and 
disagreement in American class action law.  By looking at the current 
tensions within the American system, Japanese lawmakers can prepare for 
and avoid judicial disagreements underway in the United States.  
Additionally, the next section examines whether the American system 
achieves the theoretical goals of class action law.  This comment examines 
the Wal-Mart and McReynolds cases, asking whether Rule 23(a)(3)’s 
                                                      
246 Coffee, supra note 242, at 1350. 
247 Id. at 1351. 
248 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 §2(a)(3)(A) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1711-15). 
249 John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
288, 307 (2010). 
250  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 §2(a)(3)(A) (codified at 28 USCA § 1711-
15). 
251  John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1441, 1446-47 (2005). 
252  Coffee, supra note 249, at 307; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712. 
253  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57. 
254  See infra §(IV)(D) (showing that numerosity and commonality may hinder plaintiffs’ ability to 
bring class action lawsuits). 
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commonality requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement 
undermine those goals. 
D. Wal-Mart and its Impact on Class Certification 
 In the three years following the Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision, the case 
has been cited over 1,500 times in cases and over 380 times in law review 
articles.255  Wal-Mart fundamentally changed the landscape of American 
class actions.256  In Wal-Mart, a class of 1.5 million current and former 
female employees sued Wal-Mart, alleging discrimination relating to wages 
and promotion opportunities.257  The plaintiffs sued as a Rule 23(b)(2) class, 
requesting backpay in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief.258  The 
district court certified the plaintiffs as a class, and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the certification.259 
Since classes must demonstrate that they meet Rule 23(a) 
requirements, 260  including commonality, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs were 
heavily scrutinized.261  Plaintiffs used statistical evidence, anecdotal reports 
of discrimination from approximately 120 employees, and testimony by a 
sociologist to try to satisfy the commonality requirement.262  The evidence 
failed to convince the U.S. Supreme Court, however, which determined that 
the plaintiffs did not meet the commonality requirement.263  As the Court 
explained, commonality asks not whether there are common questions, but 
whether there are common answers.264  The Court found it difficult to find 
common answers in Wal-Mart:  with 1.5 million plaintiffs, the class 
contained significant differences in job positions, pay, age, and so on.265  
The class members’ interests likely diverged.266  The Court found no single 
common question uniting the plaintiffs.267 
The dissent in Wal-Mart explained the difficulty with the majority’s 
reasoning, observing that the majority blurred the distinction between Rule 
                                                      
255  See generally Shepard’s Report: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541. 
256  See Barry M. Kazan & Gabrielle Y. Vazquez, Viability of Rule 23(b)(3) Cases After ‘Dukes’, 
‘Amgen’ and ‘Comcast’, N.Y. L.J. (June 10, 2013), available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/Pub 
ArticleNY.jsp?id=1202603355401&slreturn=20131102010944. 
257  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547. 
258  Id. 
259  Id. at 2549. 
260  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
261  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57. 
262  Id. at 2549. 
263  Id. at 2556-57. 
264  Id. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda 2009, supra note 203, at 132). 
265  See id. at 2556-57. 
266  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57. 
267  Id. 
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23(a)’s commonality requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement. 268   The Court refused to certify this class because the 
differences between class members destroyed commonality, precluding a 
common answer or adjudication that would be appropriate for every class 
member.269  Whether this merged the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement 
and the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is up for debate,270 but 
nevertheless, the 23(a)(2) commonality requirement is now a higher standard 
post-Wal-Mart. 
Wal-Mart and the heightened commonality standard provide a useful 
starting point for examining commonality and numerosity within the 
Japanese class action system.  Japan’s new class action law strengthens the 
country’s existing consumer-based group litigation system.271  It allows 
Japanese courts to award compensatory damages for harm done to 
consumers, but does not allow for emotional or physical damage claims.272  
Although this new system does not go as far as the U.S. system, it is 
considered a “step toward an American-style class action system.”273  Still, 
not everyone is convinced that a class action system will work in Japan.274  
When Japan does implement its class action system, understanding the 
difficulties that U.S. courts have had with commonality and numerosity will 
be useful. 
Wal-Mart began a jurisprudential dialogue on class action certification 
in the United States.  One year after Wal-Mart, in McReynolds v. Merrill 
Lynch, the Seventh Circuit evaluated the class certification of 700 securities 
brokers.275  Writing for the majority, Judge Richard Posner distinguished 
McReynolds from Wal-Mart.276  Where Wal-Mart consisted of “a class 
action by more than a million current and former employees [and was] 
unmanageable,”277 the McReynolds case, by contrast, fell on the other side of 
                                                      
268  Id. at 2565. 
269  Id. at 2556-57. 
270  See id. at 2561-66 (J. Ginsburg, dissenting). 
271  Yuko Takeo, Third Arrow Surprise: More Lawsuits?, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2013, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/05/24/third-arrow-surprise-more-lawsuits/. 
272  Id.; 2013 Class Action Law, supra note 7 
273  Takeo, supra note 271. 
274  Before the law was passed, one attorney stated that “[t]he whole idea of Japan adopting class 
actions is totally nonsense . . . There is no way that will ever happen.”  Osaki, supra note 141. 
275  McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488 (2012).  This case 
is relevant to Japan as it shows a large class seeking individual damages in addition to injunctive relief.  In 
lawsuits similar to this one, individual damage awards may require individual determinations, potentially 
destroying commonality and predominance.  Though Japan’s bifurcated system may address these issues, 
examining them is useful to illustrate a difficult task for judges—evaluating the merit of individual claims 
in such a large class. 
276  See generally McReynolds, 672 F.3d 482. 
277  Id. at 488. 
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the “line that separates a company-wide practice from an exercise of 
discretion by local managers.”278  The Wal-Mart case involved a “policy of 
[managerial] discretion [which] produced an overall sex-based disparity,”279 
whereas the McReynolds policy was a company-wide practice.280 
The managerial discretion exercised in Wal-Mart and McReynolds is 
difficult to distinguish.281  It is easier to distinguish the cases on other 
grounds, such as by the number of class members and the fact that 
McReynolds presented fewer case management problems for the presiding 
judge.282 
One key difference between the two cases is the use of Rule 23(c)(4) 
in McReynolds.283  Rule 23(c)(4) states that, “an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”284  Judge 
Posner explained that “[t]he practices challenged in [McReynolds] present a 
pair of issues that can most efficiently be determined on a classwide basis, 
consistent with [Rule 23(c)(4).]”285  After Wal-Mart and McReynolds, class 
action litigants face uncertainty in both how to construct their claims and 
whether those claims are likely to succeed.286 
Three recent cases have added to the basic framework provided in 
Wal-Mart and McReynolds.  Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & 
Trust Funds287 and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend288 represent the latest class 
action case law from the U.S. Supreme Court.289  Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co.290 is the latest response by Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  Amgen involved a securities fraud complaint where 
the Court concluded that questions of law or fact do not have to be proven as 
                                                      
278  Id. at 490. 
279  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556. 
280  McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489-90. 
281  Judge Posner aptly notes:  “[T]o the extent that . . . regional and local managers exercise discretion 
regarding the compensation of the brokers whom they supervise, the case is indeed like Wal-Mart.”  Id. at 
489. 
282  McReynold contained a class of 700 plaintiffs, whereas Wal-Mart plaintiffs numbered over one 
million.  See generally McReynolds, 672 F.3d 482; Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541. 
283  McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 483. 
284  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
285  McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491. 
286  For an overview of how courts have treated Rule 23(c)(4) class construction, see generally Jenna 
Smith, “Carving at the Joints”: Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class Actions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
1187 (2013). 
287  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
288  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
289  See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Decides 2 Securities Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/business/supreme-court-rules-in-amgen-and-sec-
securities-fraud-cases.html?_r=1&. 
290  Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013) 
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a prerequisite to class certification.291  In what could be seen as a step back 
from Wal-Mart’s intense examination of commonality, the Court took 
another course in Comcast.292  In Comcast, the Court required that a class be 
capable of measuring damages on a classwide basis prior to certification.293  
Like Wal-Mart, this decision placed heightened demands on plaintiffs’ to 
prove their case.294  Butler was remanded to the Seventh Circuit in light of 
Comcast,295 providing Judge Posner with another opportunity to soften the 
impact of the Supreme Court’s increased demands on class action plaintiffs. 
The claims in Butler arose from a defect in Sears washing 
machines.296  As Judge Posner explained, the lawsuit was “really two class 
actions because the classes have different members and different 
claims . . . One class action complains of a defect that causes mold . . . the 
other of a defect that stops the machine inopportunely.”297  The U.S. 
Supreme Court instructed the Seventh Circuit to reevaluate certification 
based on the Comcast decision.298  Judge Posner concluded that the first 
issue, the mold defect, constituted a problem that was common to the entire 
class.299  He determined that liability could be measured by “individual 
hearings” and that the “parties probably would agree on a schedule of 
damages based on the cost of fixing or replacing class members’ mold-
contaminated washing machines.”300  If problems arose as litigation went on, 
the class could be broken up into subclasses under 23(c)(4) or (5).301  For the 
second issue, the court determined that class certification was appropriate as 
“it was more efficient for the [defect] issue . . . to be resolved in a single 
proceeding than for it to be litigated separately[.]”302 
After explaining why class certification was appropriate for the issues 
in Butler, Judge Posner went on to distinguish Comcast.303  He explained 
that Comcast holds “that ‘the first step in a damages study is the translation 
                                                      
291  Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1190. 
292  Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
293  Id. 
294  “The unstated assumption underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast is that the 
individualized nature of the damages inquiry in a Rule 23(b)(3) analysis should be weighed against the 
commonalities in the liability aspects of a claim for purposes of the predominance analysis . . . ”  Kazan & 
Vazquez, supra note 256. 
295  Butler, 727 F.3d at 797. 
296  Id. 
297  Id. 
298  “The question presented by the Supreme Court’s remand is one of law—whether the Comcast 
decision cut the ground out from under our decision ordering that the two classes be certified.”  Id. at 798. 
299  Id. at 798-90. 
300  Id. at 798. 
301  Butler, 727 F.3d at 798. 
302  Id. at 799. 
303  Id. at 799-800. 
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of the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic 
impact of that event.’”304  In Comcast, the damages methodology created a 
theory of liability and identified damages that may not have been the result 
of the specific wrong alleged.305  By contrast, the damages in Butler could be 
attributable only to issues claimed by the class members.306 
As the calculation of damages in Comcast is readily contrasted with 
the applicable calculation in Butler, Judge Posner asked:  “[W]hy did the 
Supreme Court remand the case to us for reconsideration in light of 
[Comcast]?”307  He explained that the remand must be based on “the 
emphasis that the majority opinion places on the requirement of 
predominance and on its having to be satisfied by proof presented at the 
class certification stage rather than deferred to later stages in the 
litigation.”308  When a theory of damages liability includes damages that 
may be attributable to acts other than the claims alleged by the class, it 
allows for the possibility that questions that affect only individual members 
might predominate over questions common to the class.309  This comment 
argues that such a scenario appears to violate Rule 23(b).  This comment 
argues that in effect, the U.S. Supreme Court’s concern over damages 
calculations in Comcast was an extension of its ongoing concern that 
plaintiffs meet Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement.310 
The judicial dialogue between the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme 
Court is ongoing.311  It could be some time before plaintiff attorneys have a 
clear understanding of the scope of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement, the permissible uses of Rule 23(c)(4), and what is necessary to 
satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.  At first glance, the Comcast 
decision appears to focus solely on the importance of tying specific damages 
to specific claims, but this comment argues that the decision also strengthens 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. 
                                                      
304  Id. at 799 (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433) (emphasis in original). 
305  Butler, 727 F.3d at 799. 
306  Id. at 800. 
307  Id. 
308  Id. 
309  Id. 
310  The Sixth Circuit decided an issue identical to one in Butler (the mold issue) in In re Whirlpool 
Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013).  In Whirlpool, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded on remand that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement was met.  Id. at 859. 
311  Though this comment has refrained from significantly analyzing the dissenting opinions in Wal-
Mart, Amgen, and Comcast, the Supreme Court itself is engaged in ongoing internal dialogue as to the 
proper role of Rule 23(a)’s commonality and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance.  Kazan & Vazquez, supra note 
256. 
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V. PREDOMINANCE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A JAPANESE CLASS 
ACTION LAW 
As Japan develops its own class action system, it will help to examine 
the tensions within U.S. case law over interpreting the commonality and 
predominance requirements.  Japanese lawmakers should be wary of how 
they construct class action laws, as unclear laws or ambiguities left for 
judges to resolve may undermine and weaken the class action system as a 
tool for plaintiffs.  If Japanese attorneys are concerned with commonality 
and predominance issues, they may forgo such a class action suit entirely in 
favor of joinder, individual actions, or other alternatives, such as arbitration 
or no lawsuit at all. 
Examining the U.S. class action system reveals a number of issues 
that Japanese lawmakers implementing a class action system will need to 
consider.  Japan should plan how the new class action law will develop over 
time—whether Japanese plaintiffs will be allowed to structure a class action 
lawsuit without a SQCO, whether future class members will be able to opt 
out (such as a Rule 23(b)(3) class) or not opt out (as in a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
limited fund class), or whether members will be required to opt out to 
preserve individual claims.  This Part explains why Japan should observe the 
current atmosphere around class action law in the United States.  Lastly, this 
comment considers an alternative perspective—whether the United States 
has more to gain from observing Japan’s new class action law—and offers 
concluding remarks.   
A. Japan Should Observe the Case Law Development of the U.S. Class 
Action System  
 The U.S. class action system demonstrates the strengths 312  and 
weaknesses 313  of class actions generally. The jurisprudential dialogue 
between the Supreme Court and Judge Posner demonstrates that some 
aspects of class action certification remain unsettled and controversial within 
the United States.314  The Wal-Mart decision showcases a trade-off between 
the practicality of trying the case and serving justice.315  The Court rightly 
considered the justiciable difficulties that would arise from having a class of 
                                                      
312  See Alexander, supra note 192, at 1. 
313  See Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: BofA Settlement Reveals Further Weaknesses of Class Action 
System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2012, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/09/28/dealpolitik-bofa-
settlement-reveals-further-weaknesses-of-class-action-system/. 
314  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (2011); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 800 
(7th Cir. 2013). 
315  See generally Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541. 
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one million people, pointing to the likelihood that individual issues would 
predominate over the issues presented by the class as a whole.316  The 
outcome of Wal-Mart, however, shows that companies can be “too big to 
sue.”317  If a company policy harms a large enough number of people—and 
the policy does not overtly discriminate—the company may argue that a 
class action is not appropriate because individual issues would predominate 
due to the class size. 
Class actions do not always present David versus Goliath stories.  
There is a contradiction in a system designed to allow large numbers of 
plaintiffs with small claims to sue for the sake of efficiency, while 
simultaneously rejecting classes where excessive size creates a 
predominance of individual issues.  Still, the Wal-Mart decision shows that 
too-large classes can present judicial management problems. 318   Japan 
should take this into consideration as it implements its own class action law.  
Japan’s new law does not take effect for a few years,319 leaving ample 
time to further research and prepare for potential problems or unwanted 
consequences of a class action system.  Japan should draw from the U.S. 
experience and develop its own well-articulated class action system. 
B. Components of the U.S. Class Action System that Would Benefit 
Japan’s Class Action Development 
 Japan may benefit by incorporating parts of the U.S. class action 
system into its own system.  First, this section explains how integrating the 
U.S. class certification process will address some of the problems observed 
in Japan’s legal system.  Then it explains why having a legally defined class 
action system is beneficial to any legal system. 
 The new Japanese class action law already incorporates pieces of the 
U.S. class certification process.320  The new system,321 includes requirements 
similar to the U.S. numerosity and commonality certification 
requirements.322  These two components will help ensure that Japanese 
judges certify class actions only when the consumers’ claims are similar 
                                                      
316  Id. at 2556-57. 
317  See Lila Shapiro, Walmart: Too Big To Sue, HUFFINGTON POST, June 20, 2011, http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/walmart-too-big-to-sue_n_880930.html (last visited May 17, 2014);  
see also Laura Flanders, The Supreme Court’s Free Pass on Sexism for Walmart, THE GUARDIAN, June 21, 
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/21/walmart-women-class-action 
(last visited May 17, 2014). 
318  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57. 
319  See SHŌHISHACHŌ (消費者庁) [CONSUMER AFFAIRS AGENCY], supra note 138. 
320  See Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
321  Supra Part III. 
322  See Ujino, supra note 160. 
JUNE 2014  THE NEW CLASS ACTIONS IN JAPAN  827 
 
enough to be efficient to resolve in a single action.323  By requiring a 
sufficiently large number of plaintiffs who suffered from the same harm, the 
judiciary can save time by having one fact-gathering session for the entire 
class.324  This requirement benefits judges because they do not have to hear 
the same set of facts numerous times, and it benefits plaintiffs who can rely 
on a SQCO to represent them in court. 
 The two-stage process325 in Japan’s new system reduces judicial waste, 
but it may not provide consistent results for all consumers.  Plaintiffs must 
allow the SQCO to present their claims to the court.326  Once the SQCO files 
the consumers’ claims with the court, the court allows the defendant to 
approve or reject claims.327  Courts may approve some claims, ending those 
claimants involvement in the litigation,328 whereas courts may reject others’ 
claims, requiring further litigation.329  The new law should incorporate a 
standardized system to determine the result for all plaintiffs.  Consistency 
will protect the reputation of the judiciary and will ensure that each person 
receives justice equally.   
 The new class action system does not appear to include the typicality 
and adequacy components of U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).330  
These requirements may be lacking because in the new system class action 
suits are not brought by individual plaintiffs—they are brought by a 
SQCO—and there are no named plaintiffs.  One benefit of the typicality and 
adequacy components is that they appear to serve as a second review of the 
class members, making certain that the harm suffered by the class members 
is similar enough to warrant group action.  Though neither typicality nor 
adequacy appears to fit within the current framework of Japan’s class action 
system, implementing a mechanism to double-check or review the 
relationship between members of a proposed class could be invaluable.  
Mistakenly certifying a class will necessitate a court to do additional and 
costly fact-finding.  Japan should consider including an additional safeguard, 
such as requiring all SQCOs to provide an independent report for the court; 
the report could demonstrate the similarities between the harm done to the 
plaintiffs.  
                                                      
323  See Nishigaki & Yoshida, supra note 1, at 2. 
324  See Cohelan, supra note 180, at §1.04; Class Action: An Overview, supra note 193. 
325  The author notes that this two-stage process appears very similar to a U.S. 23(c)(4) class.  The first 
stage determines liability and the second stage resolves damages. 
326  See Cohelan, supra note 180, at §1.04; Class Action: An Overview, supra note 193. 
327  Id. 
328  See id. 
329  See id. 
330  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); 2013 Class Action Law, supra note 7. 
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 Other components of the U.S. class action system may not fit well in 
Japan, such as the ability for some plaintiffs to receive treble damages331 for 
harm done to them.  Though it may add to the deterrent effect of class action, 
that component incentivizes lawsuits and runs counter to the longstanding 
Japanese philosophy of legal restraint.332  Japan has long been a state of legal 
restraint.333  Professor Yosiyuki Noda of the University of Tokyo has argued 
that “[t]o an honourable [sic] Japanese the law is something undesirable, 
even detestable, something to keep as far away as possible . . . To take 
someone to court . . . is a shameful thing[.]”334  While consumer redress by 
means of collective action is important, it should not necessarily produce an 
increase in litigation generally.  Increasing the incentive to file a lawsuit 
appears inappropriate for Japan.  
 Most importantly, Japan can look to recent U.S. court decisions on 
class action law to predict difficulties and questions that may arise within 
Japan’s class action system.  As the Wal-Mart and McReynolds cases 
demonstrate, there is tension between the ability of judges to adequately 
manage and address common questions—and find common answers—when 
there are massive numbers of plaintiffs and the objective of class action 
lawsuits to promote efficiency, consistency, and fairness.  As Japan refines 
its own class action law, it should examine how U.S. judges have dealt with 
these issues. 
C. Should the United States Look to Japan for Class Action Answers? 
While the majority of this comment is dedicated to the argument that 
Japan should examine the U.S. class action law, the confusion and 
disagreement apparent in current U.S. jurisprudence on class actions 
suggests that it is the United States who should follow Japan’s path.  Japan’s 
new class action law is distinct from U.S. class action law because it creates 
a bifurcated class action system.335  That is, the judiciary makes an initial 
determination of liability in the first stage and, if the defendant is found 
                                                      





332  See Goodman 2001, supra note 38, at 769. 
333  See id. 
334  Y. Yoda, Introduction to Japanese Law, in HIROSHI ODA, supra note 27, at 4. 
335  Supra note 159. 
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liable, it is followed by a second stage of individual damage 
determinations.336 
Though the new Japanese class action law only allows for limited 
types of recovery,337 it provides a blueprint for U.S. class action litigation 
governed by Rule 23(c)(4).  Under Rule 23(c)(4), U.S. courts may certify 
issue classes.338  In the United States, a class can theoretically be certified on 
a singular issue, and litigation can proceed to resolve defendants’ liability to 
that class.339  If the defendants are found liable, then a second-stage damages 
determination could proceed.340  However, in practice, it is very difficult for 
U.S. plaintiffs to certify classes under Rule 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4) due to the 
predominance concerns raised by Wal-Mart.341  Moreover, even where U.S. 
plaintiffs successfully avoid predominance concerns in the liability phase by 
becoming certified as an issue class, as they did successfully in McReynolds, 
U.S. courts still express doubt that such plaintiffs could be successfully 
certified in a subsequent damages phase due to the predominance of 
individual issues. 
To address the predominance and commonality concerns voiced by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Wal-Mart and McReynolds, U.S. litigators should 
examine how the Japanese two-stage proceeding works, and see whether it 
substantially burdens the judiciary.  Japan’s new law provides creative 
solutions to lighten the burden on the judiciary during the damages phase.  
For example, where a defendant is found liable in the first phase, a full-
fledged trial to determine damages does not necessarily ensue because 
individual plaintiffs must first submit claims for their damages, giving 
defendants an opportunity to accept or reject the claims.342  Only damages 
claims that are still disputed are sent to a full trial.343  The United States 
could look for other alternatives as well.  The damages determination could 
be based upon a damages schedule set by the trial court, wherein the 
damages awarded are based upon specific conditions being met, or 
alternatively, class members could be required to arbitrate their damages 
                                                      
336  See supra Part III.B. 
337  Supra note 157. 
338  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
339  See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490-91 (allowing certification because although a single proceeding 
could not resolve all of the class members’ claims, “at least it wouldn’t be necessary . . . to determine 
whether the challenged practices were unlawful.”); see also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 
1227 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006).  But see Castano 
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
340  Id. 
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with defendants.  By looking to Japan’s new law, U.S. litigants can observe 
the efficacy of the two-stage process. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 In recent years Japan has made significant changes to its legal system.  
The creation of new, dedicated-law schools and reforms to the judiciary 
exemplify these changes.  More significantly, Japan passed class action 
legislation that it will implement within the next three years.  The new class 
action system is another step in reforming the Japanese legal system.  
Japan’s new class action system will include components that are similar to 
those found in the U.S. class certification process—including the 
certification prerequisites of numerosity and commonality.  These are 
valuable pieces of a functional class action system because they help 
promote judicial economy.  As shown by U.S. case law, however, 
numerosity and commonality can give rise to difficult legal questions for the 
judiciary and impair plaintiffs’ access to the court via a class action.  As it 
begins to implement its own class action law, Japan should examine the U.S. 
system to improve its chances of success.  Japan’s new class action law is a 
courageous attempt to protect consumers.   
Just as Japan will benefit from examining U.S. class action 
jurisprudence, the United States can improve its own class action system by 
examining Japan’s new law.  The new Japanese law uses a bifurcated 
process, separating liability and damages phases for class members.  This 
two-stage process can be theoretically implemented in the United States 
using Rule 23(c)(4).  Japan’s new law may satisfactorily account for 
concerns relating to predominance, commonality, and judicial management.  
U.S. litigants will benefit by observing this system in action.  By studying 
each other, litigants in Japan and the United States may find creative and 
successful means of litigating class actions. 
